Draine on Society

On Tuesday December 1st, 2009, President Barack Obama made public his intention to send an additional 30,000 American soldiers to the combat theater of Afghanistan.  Though expected, this move was drastic and raised questions about the intentions of his administration regarding the ongoing wars in both Iraq and Afghanistan.  The decision to add 30,000 troops to Afghanistan is reminiscent of the decision of the Bush administration to bolster the troop levels in Iraq by approximately 25,000.

The obvious parallel to President Obama’s recent decision is the surge in Iraq.  Conventional wisdom holds that the surge has been a great success.  When looking at the numbers, one can see that since 2006, when the surge was implemented, conditions on the ground in Iraq have improved.  These conditions are measured in terms of American lives lost, Iraqi civilian lives lost, output of oil, and access to electricity.  It must still be noted that these measures are still worse than pre-war conditions in Iraq.

Yet, this conventional wisdom begs greater scrutiny.  What the surge has achieved is something commonsense.  With more boots on the ground, coalition forces have a greater ability to project their influence and secure the civilian population.  In my mind, however, the true test of whether the surge has been a success is whether or not such conditions will persist after the approximately 25,000 troops have been withdrawn from operations in Iraq.

By adopting such a metric, we do not yet know whether or not the surge has truly been successful.  The provinces which have seen the greatest improvements in security have been the provinces which are dominated by Sunnis.  This may appear like a great victory.  After all, the Sunni population had been the major force behind the insurgency following the fall of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’ath Party.  However, the real reason for the improvement in security conditions in these regions has been the fact that the Sunni minority has needed a protective ally to shield them from the vindictive Shi’a majority.  Many Sunni sheikhs and tribes decided to band with the Americans in exchange for protection and weaponry.  A similar narrative has been occurring with the Kurdish population in Northern Iraq, although there is a longer history of cooperation between the Kurds and the United States.

The parts of Iraq that we find ourselves unable to control or secure are the Shi’a areas.  The Shi’a majority, finding themselves in a position of power, have been exercising that power in a vengeful manner against their former Sunni oppressors.  Large-scale pogroms have taken place in cities and towns across Iraq; much of the drop in violence over the past few years is due to the fact that many neighborhoods have been effectively purged at this point.  There is no need to protect Sunni families in some neighborhoods; they have all been killed or driven out already

The United States has been buying the security and cooperation of the Kurds, Sunni, and Shi’a through firepower.  This is especially true of the Kurds and Sunni who feel threatened by a newly empowered Shi’a majority.  The role of the U.S. Armed Forces in Iraq has been to serve as a buffer between the groups to prevent full-fledged warfare.  A real outbreak of fighting between any two groups would likely escalate into a complete Civil War between the three Iraqi factions.

Despite the many successes enjoyed by the United States Army and Marines in adopting true counter-insurgency tactics and strategy, we ultimately find ourselves at a fork in the road.  The insurgency, as it has been traditionally defined, has been effectively marginalized.  Much of the domestic insurgency has shifted their alignment to the quasi-legitimate Sunni faction.  The foreign insurgency will always remain a problem but one that should be dealt with at the borders.  The vacuum of power left by Saddam Hussein has been filled by three parties, each of which seeks to exert its influence over national affairs.  The government of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki has shown itself unwilling to effectively incorporate Sunnis or Kurds into the governing coalition.  At this point, it seems like there is little role for large-scale ground operations in Iraq except to prevent a full-blown Civil War.  Thus, the question becomes how long are we willing to keep our soldiers in Iraq to prevent a political and military implosion?

I do not think there is a clear answer to that question.  I believe that we cannot stay in Iraq indefinitely, but that we should also not allow Iraq to fall into a disastrous Civil War as a consequence of our reckless invasion.  Ultimately, I feel the best scenario would be to abandon the idea of Iraq itself; rather, the country should be partitioned into three sovereign entities.  This would be similar in practice to the partitioning of a Muslim Pakistan from a Hindu India.  We could facilitate the creation of a Sunni state, a Shi’a state, and a Kurdish state.  Such a decision would have to emanate from within the Iraqi population.  A significant obstacle to this partition is the negotiation of oil rights.  The Sunni population occupies land that is lacking in oil resources; the Shi’a would want more extensive oil rights as well as political power over the Kurds and Sunnis.  Any partition would have to strike a delicate balance between the royalties each group would receive from oil profits.  Although this would not ameliorate all the tensions and problems that will arise, it would swap a Civil War for minor border skirmishes and political rivalry.

All this brings us back to Afghanistan.  Although there are notable differences between Afghanistan and Iraq, such as a different ethnic composition, more mountainous terrain and less oil, we still find ourselves confronting many of the same questions.

When we send 30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan, what is our ultimate goal?  Is the goal to create a vibrant democracy which will act like a beacon to the Middle East and Central Asian Steppes?  Or is it simply to provide measurable increases in security, drops in violence, and then declare victory and pack up?  What do we understand the long-term ramifications of such actions to be?  Without such goals, any military operation is doomed to fail.

We must also ask ourselves what is truly feasible.  To create a secular democracy that fully supports human rights in Afghanistan would be a noble goal, but an unrealistic one.  To eradicate the poppy industry in Afghanistan would also be a worthwhile goal that could help thwart the heroin trade, but is also unattainable unless we can offer a substitute crop or industry.  We can secure the cities, but it is not feasible to secure every mountain pass that connects them.

The best feasible goal that I have heard suggested is to dramatically improve the condition of women in Afghanistan by means of education.  There is currently a dissatisfied fraction of the Afghani population that wishes to send their daughters to school – something opposed by the Fundamentalist Taliban.  The Taliban, and other Fundamentalist organizations, have attempted to dissuade families and young girls by means of terror and acid attacks.  By making the protection of these schools and young women a priority, the United States can truly better the lives of these women, their families, and their communities.  Educated and empowered women will be better able to stand up for their own rights and the rights of others.  As mothers, they will instill the value of education upon their own children and we may hope to see progressive ideology begin to spread throughout Afghanistan.  Furthermore, such a goal would be just and virtuous in the stage of world opinion; we are not seeking to exploit a natural resource, but instead to protect and promote self-improvement of the local community.  Such protection would also inspire more local confidence in the abilities of the United States and the government of Hamid Karzai to protect them against the Taliban.  Experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that people are only willing to oppose Fundamentalist groups once they feel that they and their families are safe from retribution.  Such protection would allow a domestic counter-Taliban movement to foster and effect change from within.  Any other change, such as those imposed externally, would ultimately not be seen as legitimate.

As I have stated before, there is no clear answer to any of these questions.  These question are murky and often require detailed knowledge of the situation that is not made available to a civilian.  That being said, I will now outline my proposal of how to move forward in Iraq and Afghanistan.

In Iraq, the United States must begin implementing an exit strategy as we cannot become stuck in the sand indefinitely.  If a partition is feasible and supported by the Iraqi population, then that is how we should proceed.  Each separate state would then have the option of having American forces based there.  An election would determine whether or not we should stay or leave.  However, if the partition is not feasible or popular, then we should hold provincial elections asking the Iraqi people whether or not they want coalition forces to remain.  Different provinces will return different answers; it is likely that Shi’a provinces will want American forces to leave and Sunni and Kurdish provinces will want them to stay.  By doing this, we can leave the areas where we are unwanted and stay behind in the areas where our presence is sorely needed.

In Afghanistan we must concede that it is impossible to conquer and hold the entire country.  It has not earned the moniker “the graveyard of empires” for no reason.  We must focus our efforts on the cities and major transportation routes.  In addition, we must also make the security and education of women a top priority as such an approach represents one of our best options to successfully transforming Afghanistan.  This must also be coupled with an aggressive micro-lending operation that is given protection by the United States Armed Forces.  The infusion of education and capital, coupled with effective security against the Taliban or other Fundamentalist groups, should set the stage for a metamorphosis of Afghani society that erodes support for groups that wield terror as a weapon.